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1.  Introduction 
Diversification into horticultural production is generally regarded to contribute to poverty 
alleviation. Horticultural crops are labor intensive and studies in South and Southeast Asia 
show that the per capita incomes of fruit and vegetable producers are up to five times higher 
than those of cereal producers (Lumpkin, Weinberger, & Moore, 2005). However, the 
opportunities the horticultural sector opens up for farmers in developing countries can be 
impeded by the proliferation of public and private food safety standards (Vorley & Fox, 
2004). The fresh fruit and vegetables (FFV) sector is an increasingly buyer-driven chain 
(Gereffi, 1994) in which large firms, especially supermarkets, determine the conditions such 
as scale, volume of procurement, consistency and compliance with standards (Boselie & Kop, 
2004). There is an ongoing debate about whether standards exclude certain types of producers 
from supply chains and thus worsen inequality (Vorley & Fox, 2004). Compliance with 
standards usually requires substantial investments in technological change and upgrading at 
producer level (Reardon, Timmer, & Berdegué, 2004). Studies have shown that farmers are 
less likely to adopt a standard if they possess smaller farms, are less integrated and less-
organized, have less physical, social and human capital and lack access to credits (Asfaw, 
Mithöfer, & Waibel, 2007; Chemnitz, 2007; Okello, 2005). However, these studies have 
neglected the role of public-private partnerships (PPP) and assistance by exporters in the 
compliance process with standards. Henson, Masakure & Cranfield (2010) state that the 
inclusion of small-scale farmers ultimately depends on the compliance decision of exporters. 
Different scenarios have to be considered. First, exporters can increase production on own 
farms and obtain GLOBALGAP certificates for their company farms, second, they can 
increase sourcing from certified large-scale farms, and third, they can choose to intensify 
contractual relations with small-scale farmers and assist them in achieving GLOBALGAP 
certification. Finally, exporters can also choose to opt out of the GLOBALGAP compliance 
process or choose to postpone it (Ouma, 2008). In countries where small producers are 
dominant, exporters have an incentive to support small-scale farmers in meeting food safety 
and quality standards. However, the know-how and capital to assist farmers in obtaining a 
GLOBALGAP certificate might also be lacking at the exporter’s level (Henson, Masakure, & 
Cranfield, 2010). Donors and development countries’ governments have recognized the need 
for assistance and launched public-private partnerships with exporters and farmers’ 
organizations (Humphrey, 2008). In the Thai horticultural sector several public-private 
partnerships have been initiated and most of them focus on the GLOBALGAP standard. 
GLOBALGAP is a private pre-farm
1 gate standard for good agricultural practices (GAP) and 
currently the most important standard concerning access to European markets (Henson, 
Masakure, & Cranfield, 2010). GLOBALGAP offers a group certification option that can 
make certification feasible for small-scale farmers. The main objective of this study is to 
identify the factors influencing the adoption of GLOBALGAP by fruit and vegetable farmers 
in Thailand and to find out whether exporter assistance can contribute to enable farmers to 
adopt the standard. Data of 231 farm households in the Thai horticultural sector has been 
collected from March to May 2010 within a public-private partnership program, Food Safety 
in Fresh Fruit and Vegetables (Food Safety in FFV), that supported the process of 
GLOBALGAP adoption at two levels of the value-chain: at the level of individual farmers 
and at the level of exporters/farmer groups. Of the interviewed households, 146 households 
participated in the program. The paper proceeds as follows. The next section will give some 
background about the relevance of standards in the Thai fresh fruit and vegetables sector, the 
GLOBALGAP standard and the public-private partnership program ‘Food Safety in FFV’. 
Then the conceptual framework of the study is presented, followed by the survey design and 
                                                            
1 A pre-farm gat standard means “that the certificate covers the process of the certified product from farm inputs 
like feed or seedlings and all the farming activities until the product leaves the farm” (FoodPLUS, 2010a). 2 
 
the empirical model. Next, the results of the empirical model are described and finally, a 
conclusion is drawn.  
 
2.  Public-Private Partnerships and standards in the Thai FFV sector  
Compliance with food safety and quality standards is becoming more and more important in 
the Thai FFV export sector. Exporters, especially those with markets in the European Union 
(EU) and Japan are shifting away from open-market sourcing to integrated and coordinated 
procurement in order to meet increasing food safety and traceability requirements. One of the 
major challenges of Thai FFV exporters is to satisfy the demand for GLOBALGAP certified 
produce in high-value markets (Sardsud, 2007). The number of GLOBALGAP certified 
producers is still low in Thailand with 597 certified farmers in April 2010 (FoodPLUS, 2010). 
Due to the fact that land is scarce and Thai agriculture is dominated by smallholders, one of 
the most important strategies is to intensify contractual relations with smallholders, often 
through farmer groups (Jaffee, et al., 2005). Exporters also increasingly offer technical and 
financial support to farmers in order to enable them to achieve GLOBALGAP compliance. 
However, not all exporters in Thailand have the same capacity to deal with the increasing 
demand for standards. While larger exporters might even profit from the developments and 
increase their market share, smaller exporters might lose access to high-value markets. The 
changing procurement practices of exporters imply new challenges as well as new 
opportunities for small-scale farmers. Technical assistance and the provision of capital by 
downstream actors might help small-scale farmers to upgrade their farms and increase their 
incomes. Farmers who cannot fulfill the new requirements, however, might lose their 
competitiveness. In response to the increasing importance of standards, several food safety 
initiatives have been undertaken by the Thai public and private sectors. To enhance the 
competitiveness of Thai agricultural products and to increase domestic food safety in both 
rural and urban markets, the Thai government has developed a voluntary public standard for 
good agricultural practices, Q-GAP. The Q-GAP standard is visible to the consumers, a 
requirement for export and also of several domestic high-end retailers. However, the standard 
is criticized for lacking credibility because both certification and accreditation are in the hands 
of the government and the agencies responsible for certifying farmers lack adequate financing 
(Sardsud, 2007). The inability of the public sector to satisfactorily address the new 
developments in the food sector, has led to the formation of several public-private 
partnerships, among them the donor led program ‘Food Safety in FFV’ that will be in the 
focus of this study. The program specifically aimed to increase the access of small-scale 
farmers to higher standards (in particular GLOBALGAP) and to high-value markets. 
Exporters who source from small-scale farmers, individual farmers and farmer groups who 
wish to obtain a GLOBALGAP certificate, but need assistance in doing so, were invited to 
join the program. The lack of GLOBALGAP consultants, trainers and farm advisors in 
Thailand was recognized as a major obstacle by the stakeholders. Hence, a pool of farm 
advisors, trainers and consultants were qualified to offer advice and training on 
GLOBALGAP implementation. Exporters, farmers and farmer groups received consultancy 
services and trainings on the GLOBALGAP requirements, and in turn had to agree to 
implement the GLOBALGAP standard. Since the program focused on small-scale farmers, 
support was only offered for GLOBALGAP group certification (Option 2)
2 (GTZ Thailand, 
2010). Group certification is often the only possibility for small-scale farmers to become 
certified as it can significantly reduce the costs of compliance for the individual producer. 
When farmers are linked together in a group, they can benefit from economies of scale by 
                                                            
2 GLOBALGAP offers four certification options. Under Option 1, an individual producer applies for 
GLOBALGAP certification. Under Options 3 and 4, growers are certified as meeting an equivalent, national or 
local (‘benchmarked’) standard (Will, 2010). 3 
 
sharing necessary facilities for GLOBALGAP adoption, such as a pesticide store and toilets, 
by centralizing some of the requirements (e.g. record keeping) and by sharing the costs for the 
external audit. In addition, a group structure reduces transaction costs of providing farmers 
with advice and trainings (Will, 2010). The term group certification must be treated with 
caution in regard to GLOBALGAP certification. The groups that apply for certification under 
Option 2 are not necessarily farmer groups in the traditional sense. GLOBALGAP only 
requires that the applicants for group certification must belong to a legal entity that has the 
legal right to carry out agricultural production and/or trading and can legally represent the 
group members and the members’ production sites (FoodPLUS, 2011). This implies that 
registered farmer groups as well as traders who contract farmers are able to apply for 
GLOBALGAP certification under Option 2. Both types of legal entities participated in the 
intervention ‘Food Safety in FFV’. It is important to note that the farmers in the project, who 
were not contracted by an exporter, set up farmer groups as legal entities only for the purpose 
of certification. By the time the groups were formed, the farmers had decided individually to 
obtain the GLOBALGAP standard. In the exporter groups, the costs for the implementation of 
the standard were shared between exporters and farmers. The exporters took over the 
certification costs and incurred parts of the costs for farm infrastructure and farm equipment 
for their contracted farmers. Farmers who were not linked to an exporter had to cover all costs 
that occurred during the adoption process by themselves. 
 
 
3.  Conceptual framework 
In this section, we will  derive  the  conceptual framework of the study. We will classify 
farmers as standard adopters if they are certified with a standard, have been certified in the 
past or are in the adoption process and expect to achieve certification the latest in 2011. 
GLOBALGAP adoption in this study is only observed for farmers who have participated in 
the public-private partnership program ‘Food Safety in FFV’. Hence, farmers have to make 
two subsequent decisions: whether or not to participate in the public-private partnership 
program, and if they do, whether or not to obtain a GLOBALGAP certificate. 
Figure 1: Conceptual framework – 











Source: own illustration 
Socio-economic and farm characteristics, access to information, credits and infrastructure, 
membership in farmer groups, previous contact with certification initiatives, assistance and 
participation in agricultural trainings are determinants that might influence participation in the 
public-private partnership and GLOBALGAP adoption.  
 
Determinants: 
‐  Socio-economic characteristics 
‐  Farm characteristics 
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infrastructure 
‐  Membership in farmer groups 
‐  Previous contact with 
certification initiatives 
‐  Assistance and agricultural 
trainings 
PPP program participation 






4.  Data and methodological approach 
4.1.  Survey design and data 
Data collection took place between March and May 2010. A stratified random sampling 
technique was used and the population was divided into two strata: participants in the public-
private partnership program ‘Food Safety in FFV’ and a control group. Farmers in the control 
group were selected through a random walk and chosen based on two criteria. First, control 
group famers were required to live in the same village as the program participants and second, 
they had to produce the products
3 that were considered for GLOBALGAP certification by the 
program participants in the respective village. Interviews were conducted in four of the six 
agro-ecological regions of Thailand. The vegetable farmers included in the survey are mainly 
based in the Central and Western regions of Thailand, whereas the fruit farmers are located in 
Northern, Eastern and Southern Thailand. In total, 231 fruit and vegetable producers were 
interviewed of which 146 farmers are participants in the public-private partnership and 85 
farmers are members of the control group. The following table shows GLOBALGAP 
adoption and Q-GAP adoption for the two groups in the sample. 




certified disadopt  process  adopters certified disadopt Process adopters
N % N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
PPP 
participants  146  117  80  9  6  4  3 130 89 72 49 18 12  8  5  98 67 
Control 
group   85  23  27  11  13  3 4  36  42  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total    231  140  67  20  7 7 3  166 72  72  31  18  8 8 3  98  42 
 
With respect to Q-GAP certification, we find that the rate of standard adoption is much higher 
among the public-private partnership program participants than among the farmers in the 
control group. Of the program participants, 89% can be classified as Q-GAP adopters while 
only 42% of the farmers in the control group have adopted the Q-GAP standard. Moreover, 
the data shows the vital role that the public-private partnership program plays with respect to 
GLOBALGAP certification since none of the control group farmers has adopted the standard. 
In the group of the program participants, 49% of the farmers are certified with 
GLOBALGAP, 12% have already disadopted the standard (initial certification took place 
within the program) and 5% are still in the GLOBALGAP adoption process.  
 
4.2.Empirical model specification 
Since GLOBALGAP adoption in this study is an outcome of participation in a public-private 
partnership program, an econometric model has to be specified that takes into account a 
possible sample selection bias. Those farmers might join a public-private partnership program 
on GLOBALGAP certification who have a greater chance to successfully adopt the standard 
than randomly selected farmers (Maddala, 1983). As a result, the same unobservable factors 
that influence program participation might also influence GLOBALGAP adoption. In order to 
control for potential selection bias, we employ a bivariate probit model with sample selection 
(van de Ven & van Praag, 1981). The bivariate probit model with sample selection allows for 
two separate probit models with correlated error terms. A correlated error term indicates a 
self- selection bias. Probit models assume that there is an underlying relationship between an 
                                                            
3 The following products were considered for GLOBALGAP certification: lychee, durian, mangosteen, papaya, 
dragon fruit, cantaloupe, mango, asparagus, green okra, different kinds of herbs and green leafy vegetables. 5 
 
unobserved, latent variable and the observed outcome. The specification of the bivariate 
probit model with sample selection, adapted from Greene (2008), is given by: 
Selection equation:     
∗       
       ∈  ,      1             
∗  0 ,      0             
∗  0  
Outcome equation:     
∗       
       ∈  ,      1             
∗  0 ,      0             
∗  0  
           ∈  ,∈    ~ BVN  0,0,1,1,  , Var  ∈    Var  ∈     1 ,  
Cov  ∈  ,∈        
(   ,     is observed only when      1 ), 
where   
∗are unobserved or latent variables,   
  are parameter vectors and    are vectors of 
exogenous independent variables. The error terms ∈  ,∈    have a bivariate normal distribution 
with zero mean, unit variance and correlation  . The    are dichotomous outcome variables 
and in the GLOBALGAP adoption model,  
       1  if the farmer i participates in the public-private partnership program, 0 otherwise 
       1  if the farmer i adopts GLOBALGAP, 0 otherwise. 
In the selection equation,    
∗  represents the utility that the i
th farmer receives from taking part 
in the public-private partnership, and in the outcome equation,    
∗  represents the utility from 
GLOBALGAP adoption. We assume that if   
∗  0 , then the observed outcome will be 
program participation/GLOBALGAP adoption (    1   . However,    ,      can only be 
observed if the selection condition, participation in the public-private partnership, is met 
(Greene, 2008; Neill & Lee, 2001). 
 
We expect that the two decisions, to participate in the public-private partnership program and 
to adopt the GLOBALGAP standard are determined by similar variables. This is intuitive 
because the program supports farmers in achieving GLOBALGAP certification. Factors that 
might influence the decisions can be divided into two broad categories: household and farm 
characteristics (age, education, household wealth, labor availability, farm size, intensity of 
irrigation use), and access related variables (access to credits, information and infrastructure, 
membership in farmer groups, contact to certification and GAP initiatives, participation in 
agricultural trainings, assistance by downstream actors). We draw on existing literature on the 
adoption of standards in order to derive hypotheses about the expected influences of the 
independent variables. Younger farmers are expected to be more innovative and more flexible 
in adapting their farms to new requirements and therefore more likely to participate in the 
public-private partnership program and also more likely to adopt GLOBALGAP (Asfaw, 
Mithöfer, & Waibel, 2007). The variable age of the household head (HHAGE) will capture 
the expectation. Education has been identified to be positively related to standard adoption 
(Asfaw, Mithöfer, & Waibel, 2007; Okello, 2005). The adoption of the GLOBALGAP 
standard requires a high willingness to learn. A very thorough knowledge of good agricultural 
practices has to be acquired and the requirements associated with record keeping might be 
difficult to comply with for less educated farmers. We include the dummy variable 
COLLEGE (at least one member of the household has graduated from college) to reflect the 
high knowledge intensity of the standard. The requirements of the GLOBALGAP standard are 
not only complex, but they are also time intensive. Several trainings are necessary to acquire 
the knowledge for GLOBALGAP adoption. Moreover, the farm infrastructure and the 
processes at the farm have to be upgraded to meet standard requirements. Hence, the 
availability of family labor (MEMBERS) is expected to be positively related to both decisions 
(Asfaw, Mithöfer, & Waibel, 2007). Participation in off-farm work (OFFFARM) might be 
positively or negatively related to participation in the public-private partnership program and 
to standard adoption. On the one hand, households participating in off-farm activities might 
be time constrained. On the other hand, the income from off-farm activities, in the same way 
as the ownership of non-farm assets and access to credits, might contribute to financing the 6 
 
recurrent and non-recurrent costs that are associated with GLOBALGAP compliance. Non-
recurrent costs are initial investment costs that are incurred in order to achieve compliance, 
such as the costs for physical upgrading, initial trainings and the development and 
establishment of new procedures and management systems. Recurrent costs, in contrast, are 
costs that have to be incurred on a regular basis and include the additional costs for laboratory 
analyses, management and annual certification costs (Jaffee, et al., 2005; Chemnitz, Grethe, & 
Kleinwechter, 2007). As a proxy for the ownership of non-farm assts, we include the number 
of cars the household owns (NOCARS) in the model. To reflect access to credit, the dummy 
variable CREDITFG is included which equals one if the household has access to credit via a 
farmer group. Farm size (FSIZE) is expected to be positively correlated with program 
participation and GLOBALGAP adoption. For some of the investments associated with 
GLOBALGAP there might be significant economies of scale and also the costs for the 
external audit are relatively higher for smaller than for larger farms, given that these are fixed 
costs (Jaffee, et al., 2005). The share of the cultivated area under irrigation and the use of 
more sophisticated irrigation systems, such as sprinkler or drip irrigation, might positively 
influence the two decisions (Asfaw, Mithöfer, & Waibel, 2007). Farmers who irrigate their 
crops might produce more efficiently and they might also be able to produce off-season. The 
variable IRRIFVSD in the model measures the share of the total area cultivated with fruit and 
vegetables that is irrigated by means of sprinkler or drip irrigation systems. Certification with 
Q-GAP (QGAP) is hypothesized to have a positive influence on program participation and 
GLOBALGAP adoption. Q-GAP can be seen as a proxy for export production because the 
standard is a requirement for export and also for the possession of basic knowledge about 
good agricultural practices. Farmers who wish to obtain a Q-GAP certificate are usually 
trained in good agricultural practices by the Department of Agricultural Extension in Thailand 
(Sardsud, 2007). A dummy for vegetables (VEG) is included to account for structural 
differences between fruit and vegetables farmers. Membership in farmer groups has been 
identified as especially important for GLOBALGAP adoption by previous studies (Okello, 
2005; Asfaw, Mithöfer, & Waibel, 2009). Group members often have better access to 
information and are thus also more likely to hear about new market opportunities and 
certification programs. Therefore, we include a variable on the number of farmer groups the 
household is a member of (NOGROUPS) in the model. We also expect a positive influence of 
the variable ‘years of mobile phone usage’ (YMOBILE). Mobile phone usage makes it easier 
for farmers to obtain information and it facilitates regular communication with extension 
agents and buyers. Thus, the number of years a mobile phone has been owned by a household 
is likely to reflect their progressiveness. Being located close to Bangkok is an advantage for 
farmers in the export business, because transport costs and post-harvest losses are much 
lower. Therefore we hypothesize that distance to Bangkok (DISBKK) is negatively correlated 
with GLOBALGAP adoption. Similarly, we expect that distance to the next provincial capital 
(DISPROV) has a negative influence on the adoption decision. Support by an exporter in 
GLOBALGAP adoption (SUPPORT) and the number of agricultural trainings (NOTRAIN) 
are only expected to influence GLOBALGAP adoption. Farmer trainings were offered by 
exporters and also by consultants financed by the public-private partnership program. Support 
by a buyer is expected to be especially important because they can provide knowledge and 
extension services to farmers and they often incur a large share of the compliance costs. The 
variable WGAP (participation in trainings on Western GAP) is used as an exclusion 
restriction in our model. Western GAP is a training program for good agricultural practices 
that was carried out by consultants and farm advisors who organized and carried out the 
GLOBALGAP trainings in the public-private partnership program ‘Food Safety in FFV’. 
Hence, farmers who took part in the Western GAP trainings have already been in contact with 
important stakeholders of the program before it was launched. We expect that participation in 
trainings on Western GAP has a positive impact on participation in the public-private 7 
 
partnership program. Concerning GLOBALGAP adoption, we expect that participation in the 
Western GAP trainings does not have an influence because it is a training program. Farmers 
participating in the trainings were not required to make any investments and they did not 
become certified with an official standard (Korpraditskul, 2005). Descriptive statistics for the 
independent variables included in the bivariate probit model broken down into categories of 
program participants and non-participants as well as GLOBALGAP adopters and non-
adopters are shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
















Household & farm characteristics 










DEPEND  Number of dependants  

















COLLEGE  College graduate in the household 
dummy in%  
39.04 24.71  44.90  27.08 
OFFFARM  Participation in off-farm work dummy 
in % 
39.04 38.82  40.82  35.42 

















IRRIFVSD Share  of  area  cultivated with fruit & 
vegetables irrigated by means of 










QGAP  Q-GAP certification dummy in %  80.1  27.1  88.8  62.5 
VEG  Farmer is specialized in vegetables 
production dummy in % 
29.5 43.5  37.8  12.5 
Access related variables 
CREDITFG  Access to credit  through a farmer 
group dummy in % 
60.96 56.47  50.00  83.33 










NOGROUP  Number of farmer groups the 

























SUPPORT  Farmer has received support by 
exporter in GLOBALGAP adoption 
dummy in % 
76.03 0.00  80.61  66.67 










WGAP  Western GAP training  dummy in %  30.8  9.4  31.6  30.8 
Notes: Mean values are shown. For continuous variables, standard deviations are shown in parentheses.   
a One rai equals 0.16 hectares. 8 
 
5.  Results of the adoption model 
Table 3 shows the results of the bivariate probit model. The coefficients show the direction of 
the impact of the explanatory variables on program participation and standard adoption. 
Table 3: Bivariate probit model estimates 
 – PPP program participation and GLOBALGAP adoption – 
Decision and variable  Coefficient Standard  error 
PPP program participation 
HHAGE -0.016  0.010 
MEMBERS -0.112  0.095 
DEPEND 0.027  0.114 
COLLEGE 0.816***  0.298 
OFFFARM -0.156  0.273 
NOCARS -0.2109*  0.110 
FSIZE -0.001  0.003 
IRRIFVSD 0.596**  0.263 
VEG -0.683  0.527 
QGAP 1.443***  0.237 
NOGROUPS -0.033  0.238 
CREDITFG 0.047  0.282 
YMOBILE  -0.010 0.028 
DISBKK 0.001  0.001 
DISPROV 0.003  0.005 
WGAP 105.197***  0.320 
CONSTANT -0.096  1.011 
 
GLOBALGAP adoption 
HHAGE -0.045**  0.019 
MEMBERS 0.370*  0.211 
DEPEND -0.247  0.195 
COLLEGE 0.736*  0.417 
OFFFARM -0.490  0.391 
NOCARS 0.298  0.196 
FSIZE 0.012**  0.006 
IRRIFVSD 1.390***  0.422 
VEG 1.615*  0.889 
QGAP 0.073  0.523 
NOGROUPS -0.075  0.307 
CREDITFG -1.299***  0.492 
YMOBILE 0.042  0.040 
DISBKK 0.002  0.001 
DISPROV -0.008  0.008 
SUPPORT 204.744***  0.695 
NOTRAIN 0.073***  0.027 
CONSTANT -2.995*  1.615 
Correlation rho  0.671  0.480 
N 231 
Log likelihood  -147.0851 
Log likelihood ratio test  0.73   
Notes: Statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) level 
 
The results show that ceteris paribus the probability to participate in the public-private 
partnership program increases if at least one household member has graduated from college, a 
larger share of the fruit and vegetables production area is irrigated by means of sprinkler or 9 
 
drip irrigation systems
4, the household owns a Q-GAP certificate and the household has 
participated in Western GAP trainings. Contrary to our expectations, the number of cars in the 
household is significant and negatively associated with program participation. However, this 
might reflect the aim of the program to target small-scale and resource-poor farmers and 
facilitate their access to higher standards. Our results in the adoption equation largely confirm 
the findings of previous studies on GLOBALGAP adoption. Concerning the household and 
farm characteristics, as expected, younger farmers are more likely to adopt GLOBALGAP. 
Similarly, a college degree in the household, the availability of family labor, farm size and the 
intensity of irrigation use are statistically significant and increase the probability of 
GLOBALGAP adoption. Surprisingly, the access to credits via farmer groups has a 
statistically significant, but negative impact on GLOBALGAP adoption. It is likely that 
farmers who adopt GLOBALGAP do not have to rely on micro-credits from farmer groups 
because they are able to obtain credits from other sources. It might also indicate that the 
public-private partnership program succeeded in enabling farmers with limited financial 
resources and lack of access to credits to overcome the initial barriers of standard adoption. 
The exporters involved in the program covered part of the investments for upgrading at the 
farm level, took over the certification costs and provided access to credits. The dummy 
variable on specialization in vegetable production is statistically significant and positively 
impacts standard adoption indicating that vegetable farmers were more likely to achieve 
certification in comparison to fruit farmers. As expected, support by an exporter and the 
number of agricultural training subjects attended are positively associated with 
GLOBALGAP adoption. The null hypothesis that the correlation term rho equals zero cannot 
be rejected which implies that there is no selection bias in our model
5. Marginal effects that 
are calculated at the means of the independent variables are presented in Table 4. Since we are 
mainly interested in the GLOBALGAP adoption decision, we only present the marginal 
effects for the variables that have a significant impact on the probability of GLOBALGAP 
adoption, given the conditional probability that the selection criterion, participation in the 
public-private partnership program is met. 
Table 4: Estimated marginal effects of the explanatory variables on P (y2=1 | y1=1) 
Variable Marginal  effect  Mean 
HHAGE -0.018  48.58 
MEMBERS 0.182  3.10 
COLLEGE*    0.211  0.33 
NOCARS 0.164  1.11 
FSIZE 0.006  24.02 
IRRIFVSD 0.530  0.77 
VEG* 0.713  0.34 
CREDITFG* -0.548  0.59 
SUPPORT* 0.753  0.48 
NOTRAIN 0.033  7.96 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
Judging from the magnitudes of the marginal effects, we can conclude that the availability of 
family labor, irrigation intensity, and support by an exporter are the most important factors 
influencing GLOBALGAP adoption. Conditional on the probability of participation in the 
public-private partnership program, one unit increase in the number of adult family members 
                                                            
4 The area cultivated with fruit and vegetables that is irrigated by means of sprinkler or drip irrigation systems 
refers to the area before participation in the public-private partnership program.  
5 Since there is not selection bias in our model, we also estimated two separate probit models for program 
participation and GLOBALGAP adoption. Due to space limitations, only the results of the bivariate probit model 
with sample selection are presented in this paper. 10 
 
in the household increases the likelihood of GLOBALGAP adoption by 18%, a college degree 
in the household by 21%, and a 10% increase in the share of the area cultivated with fruit and 
vegetables that is irrigated by means of sprinkler or drip irrigation systems increases the 
probability to adopt by 53%. Support by an exporter is found to be especially important and 
thus confirms our hypothesis that external support is necessary to enable farmers to adopt the 
GLOBALGAP standard. Given the conditional probability of participation in the public-
private partnership program, support by an exporter increases the probability to adopt 
GLOBALGAP by 75%. The magnitude of the marginal effect of the vegetable dummy is with 
71% similarly high. This might also be related to the intensity of support that farmers receive, 
which we do not capture in the model. From qualitative interviews with the exporters 
involved in the public-private partnership program, we learned that the intensity of support 
they are able to offer is higher for vegetable farmers than for fruit farmers. While vegetable 
farmers in Thailand often produce year-round and are therefore closely connected to their 
buyers, fruit farmers only harvest once or twice per year and have a much looser connection. 
6.  Conclusion 
The aim of the study was to identify factors influencing standard adoption by small-scale fruit 
and vegetable farmers in Thailand and to find out whether assistance by exporters can help 
small-scale farmers to overcome the initial barriers to standard adoption. Since 
GLOBALGAP adoption in this study is mainly an outcome of participation in the public-
private partnership program, we had to account for a possible selection bias. A bivariate 
probit model with sample selection was estimated where in a first step, the factors influencing 
program participation and in a second step the factors that influence GLOBALGAP adoption 
were identified. Surprisingly, our model suggests that there is no selection bias. From our 
results, we can conclude that conditional on the probability that a household participates in the 
public-private partnership, a household’s probability to adopt GLOBALGAP depends on its 
household and farm characteristics, on the number of agricultural trainings attended and on 
support by downstream actors. Concerning the household and farm characteristics, the age of 
the household head negatively influences GLOBALGAP adoption while education, the 
availability of family labor, household wealth, farm size and the intensity of irrigation use are 
positively associated with the adoption of the standard. Support by an exporter in 
GLOBALGAP adoption has been identified as vital for the adoption decision. The important 
question is whether farmers who do not possess the characteristics named above will be able 
to adopt GLOBALGAP at a later point in time when the standard is already more common in 
Thailand, or whether they might lose access to high-value markets in the long run. Some of 
the exporters involved in the public-private partnership program state that they want to extend 
their network of GLOBALGAP certified farmers once the initial problems of GLOBALGAP 
adoption are solved. Farmers who have not been able to adopt the standard until now, might 
profit from these plans. Sustainability of standard adoption is another issue that has to be 
considered. Donors are usually only able to offer support to farmers for a limited period of 
time and can help farmers to overcome the initial barriers to standard adoption. However, 
after the certificate has been obtained, support can usually not be continued. In our sample, 
one group of farmers that has adopted the GLOBALGAP standard without assistance by an 
exporter has already disadopted the standard. Sustainability is expected to be much higher if 
farmers are closely linked to exporters, who have also initiated certification for the farmers. In 
that case there is a chance that those buyers have a continued interest in the GLOBALGAP 
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